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INTRODUCTION 
TI1e takeover debate does not cease to attract scholarly and public attraction. TI1e 
huge sums involved and the sophisticated techniques of takeover defenses, combined with 
the inherent conflict of interest present in the use of defensive techniques, have made takeovers 
one of the most discussed issues in U.S. corporate law. 
The subject, however, is extremely controversial. Law~and~economics scholars have 
praised takeovers as an essential mech;;mism, since they offset the agency cost attributed to 
management control and further the allocation of resources in a more efficient manner.3 On 
the other hand, takeover detractors claim that they not only harm workers and other 
constituencies, 4 but also threaten the development of the U.S. economy.5 
While the desirability of takeovers remains an unsettled problem, it seems important 
to highlight that the veryfeasibHityofhostile takeovers is not universal. In Brazil's developing 
financial market, hostile takeovers are still virtually inexistent. As a result, the focal point in 
transactions involving the sale of control shifts to the protection of minority shareholders 
through the legal device known as the 11mandatory public offer." 
1 Trabalho apresentado para a disciplina de Business Associations, ministrada pelo Professor 
David S. Sokolow, na Universidade do Texas em Austin. Este trabalho foi por mim realizado como 
bolsista do programs de intercBmbio FIPSE~CAPES, de janeiro a maio de 2004. 
2 AI una do 1 0" semestre da Facu!dade de Direito da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sui. 
Agrade9o a Professors Claudia Lima Marques e ao Programs de P6s-Gradua98o em Direito da 
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sui a oportunidade de compartilhar a pesquisa realizada 
nos Estados Unidos por meio destes Cadernos. 
3 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 694 (2002). 
4 Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CoRPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33~56 (A. Auerbarch, ed., 1988). 
5 Arnalda Wald, Considera96es sabre a aquisit:;fio e afienagfio do contro!e societario: o estudo da 
jurisprudencia, 321 REVISTA FORENSE 3, 4 (1993). Somewhat surprisingly, whi!e most American 
scholars are sympathetic to takeovers, Brazilian academics take a critical view when they investi-
gate takeovers in the U.S. corporate scenario. 
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In fact) the incidence ofhostile takeovers in the United States is far less common 
than the extensive legal literature on the topic would suggest. In fact, there have been only 
fort;H1inc hostile takeover bids fOr U.S. corpotations in the last five years, a trivial figure when 
compared to the 4 7,000 announced acquisitions in the same period. 6 Yet, this data should not 
imply that takeover regulation is unimportant, especially if we take into account that the low 
occurrence of takeover is due in large part to the legal admissibility of a wide of variety of 
takeover defenses by U.S. statutory and case law,7 which should have the effect of discouraging 
further threats.8 
It is important to note, however, that it is the structural viability ofhostile takeovers-
and not their actual occurrence rate-that determines the emergence of a dense body of 
takeover law. Indeed) conclusions about the importance of the hostile-takeover phenomenon 
that focus exclusively on the actual number of targets seem somewhat flawed, because they 
ignore the desirable general deteiTent effect that benefits shareholders in the vast majority of 
corporations for which a hostile bid is never made. 9 
This paper docs not try to offer an exhaustive description of U.S. and Brazilian 
takeover laws; instead, it airns to demonstrate the reasons for the multitude of differences in 
takeover regulation between the two countries. The analysis is organized as follows: Part I 
discusses the essential diffCrences in the ownership structure in Brazil and in the United States. 
While U.S. corporations seem to COlTl.plywith the celebrated Bcrle and Mean,<; model, Brazilian 
companies still have higher levels of ownership concentration. Titese structural differences 
shape basic notions of corporate law in both countries. 
Part II examines the impact of the 0\vnership structure on the likelihood of a hostile 
takeover and its consequences for takeover law. A<s the chances of a hostile attempt vary 
according to the degree of dispersion of the corporation 1S stock, the rules about defensive 
measures to be implemented by the board of directors receive greater attention where, as in the 
United States, hostile bids are common enough to become a major concem. Conversely, since 
6 Mark L. Sirower, Staggering Facts, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 13, 2004. 
7 ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS 
AND liMiTO:D LiABILITY COMPANIES 1226 (2003). As of 2001, a majority of U.S. publicly-held corporations 
had poison pills. According to Thomson Financial Securities Data, in 2001 the number of compa-
nies adopting first-time or amended poison pill measures increased from 235, as compared to 188 
for the same period in 2000. The adoption staggered boards-which prevent a hostile acquirer from 
gaining control of the company in a single election-has also significantly increased. In 1990, only 
34°/o of corporations going public had such boards, whereas 71% of their counterparts did. !d. 
Indeed, an empirical study using a data set of hostile bids between 1996 and 2000 showed that 
efficient staggered boards nearly doubled the average target's odds of remaining independent, 
from 34% to 61%, reduced the chances of a bidder completing its bid from 34% to 14%, and cut the 
odds that the average target will be forced into selling to a white knight from 32% to 25%. Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk et at., The Powerful Antftakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and 
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 931 (2002). 
6 HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 7, at 1239 (2003). Actually, as of 1993, only 66% of hostile bids 
succeed, while as recently as 1999 the success rate reached 80% of the total attempts. fd. See 
further discussion on technical and structural barriers for takeovers in Part II( c). 
9 Coffee Jr., John C., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the 
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance. 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1192 (1984 ). 
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hostile bid.s still represent an unlikely scenario in BrazU) legal rules tend to focus on the protection 
of minority shareholders where a sale of control) usually agreed outside the public market, 
occurs. 
Part III explores how the different corporate and capital structures affect the 
importance and the regulation of an issue common to both legal systems: the control premium 
arising from the sale of controL Although this issue plays a sccondaty~though still important-
role in the United States) in Brazil sharing of control premium lies at the heart of the regulation 
of sale of control transactions. 
PART I - OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN BRAZILIAN AND U.S. 
CORPORATIONS 
A) Two models ofcmvorate governance: dispersed and concentratcdmvnership systems 
Many of the dissimilarities in Brazilian and US. corporate law can be explained by 
the different ownership structures ofboth countries' publicly held corporations. Since Berle 
and Means's seminal work, the separation of ownership and control has been described as a 
distinctive mark of the modern corporations. In their words, "control divorced from ownership 
is not ... a familiar concept. It is a characteristic product of the COlllorate system." 10 
Nevertheless, the separation of ownership and control is not a necessary product of 
every corporate system. Even though Ame1ican publicly held corporations on the whole fOHow 
such a pattern) Berle and Means's paradigm is not universalty accurate. In Brazil, as in other 
developed and developing countries, ownership is still significantly concentrated.' 1 
A study canicd out by an economist at Brazil's National Development Bank (BNDES) 
analyzed the ownership structure of2 78 publidy~held corporations. The research, based on 
Thomsen and Pedersen's definitions, 12 revealed that the control structure in Brazil is still 
distant from Berle and Means's modeL 
10 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORF'ORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69 (1932). 
11 Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FiN, 471, 472 (1999). 
12 Tagore V. de Siqueira, Concentration of Ownership in Brazilian Quoted Companies, 10 REvtsTA oo 
BNDES (1998), available at http://www.bndes.gov.br/conhecimento/revista.rev1 002.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 11, 2004). The classification follows the model presented in S. THOMPSEN & T. PEDERSEN, 
EUROPEAN OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (1997). According to thiS model, the 
property is dispersed when the major shareholder has less than 20% of control, it is dominant when 
he has between 20% and 50% of control, and it is majority when he has more than 50% of control. 
A problem to the use of these figures to compare ownership concentration in Brazilian and Ameri-
can companies could arise, however, since Brazilian pubiicly-heid companies are not as large as 
their American analogues. Nevertheless, such an obstacle should not be overestimated. In an 
attempt to verify the accuracy of Thompsen & Pedersen studies with regard to the effect of the 
company's size to the ownership concentration, Tagore V. Siqueira observed that, contrary to the 
cited authors' conclusions, company size had an extremely very weak effect on ownership concen-
tration in Brazil. A possible explanation for such a phenomenon is that Brazilian publicly-held 
corporations tend to raise funds through bank loans and debt securities (bonds and debentures), 
rather than through issuance of shares. Therefore, even though some Brazilian companies have 
considerable size (see Tables 1 and 2), this has not yet triggered higher levels of ownership 
dispersion. 
380 Mariana Pargendler 
1i.1ble 1: Pri.ncipal Characteristics of the Sample by Concentration of Ownership 13 
(% oflotal Number of Shares held by Majority Stockholder) 
VARIABLE ITEM OWNER') HIP CONCEN'I'RA'l'ION 
Dispersed (Up to 20'/,,) Dominant :Vlajority 
(Between 20- (Over SO'Y,,) 
SO'Y.,) 
Companies No. 59 134 85 
% . 21.22 48.20 30.58 
Net Sales (USS) Average 1994/96 747,372,086 616,356,712 602,835,742 
Net Equity (US$) Average 1994/96 426,809,267 662,983,788 692,786,233 
Total AsseLs (US$) Aven1ge 1994/96 1,547,788,386 1,751,848,988 I 1,357,340,821 
Cost of Sales (CPV) Avemge 1994/96 469,820,845 256,924,340 284,343,090 
(IJSS) 
Net Profit (US$) Average 1994/96 25,443,552 19,248,744 24,508,146 
1i:1ble 2: Principal Characteristics of the Sample by Concentration of Ownership 14 
(% oflotal Number of Voting Shares held by Majority Stockholder) 
VARIABU: ITEM OWNERS HlP CONCENTRATION 
Dispersed Dominant Majority 
(lJp to 20'Y.o) (Betv.een 20- (Over 50'Y,,) 
50'Y.,) 
Companies No 21 69 188 
% 7.55 24.82 67.63 
Net Sales (CS$) Average 1994/96 1,276,138,418 545,834,974 602,719,994 
Net Equity (USS) Avcmge 1994/96 760,109,432 454,102,664 ; 667,889,515 
Total Assets (US$) Average 1994/96 2,733,540,359 1,512,183,147 1,489, 148,294 
Cost oCSalcs (CPV) Average 1994/96 743,955,105 269,679,262 272,91! ,707 
(USS) 
Nc\ Profil (USS) Average 1994196 43,060,381 21,178,758 20,888,172 
Considering the participation of the main shareholder's stock (i.e, the shareholder 
with the largest number of shares) in the number of total shares, 59 (21 .22%) of the coq:x;ra[ions 
bad dispmedownership, 134 (48.20%) bad domimmtownersbip, 1md8S (30.58%) had maj01ity 
13 Siqueira, supra note 12. 
14Jd. 
T,beover, O-:n1ersbip Stn1durcs and Control Pre1niu1ns: A Comparative Analysis 381 
ownership, 15 Regarding the proportion of the main shareholder's stock in the number of total 
votlilg' shares, the degree of concentration ofBrazilian's corporation lxcomes even more apparent: 
21 (755%) corporations were classified as having dispersed ownership, 69 (24.82%) as having 
dominant ownership, and 188 (67.85%) as having majority ownership. :6 
The United States as of 1994 presents a completely different picture. The main 
shareholder holds less than 10% of the voting stock in 66% of the U.S. publicly held 
corporations, 'between 10% and 25% in 17.4% of the con1panies, and between 25t}() and 
50% in 13% of them. The main shareholder owns more than 50% of the voting stock in 
only 3.6% of the corporations. 17 
The United States and Brazil, therefore, illustrate two different systems of corporate 
govem_ance. TILe 11dispersed ownership system" presents a strong securities market with high 
transparency standards regarding the disclosure of relevant infom1ation about the corporation, 
and a market for corporate control, which is its "ultimate disciplinary mechanism. 1113 The 
11
concentrated ownership system," on the contnuy, has weak financial markets with !ow 
transparency standards, an insignificant market for corporate control, and high plivate benefits 
of control 19 , i.e., the benef-lts the controllers can extract to the detriment of the minority 
through mechanisms such as above~market salaries, insider trading, unfair sel£,dealing 
transactions, and issuance of shares to themselves at dilutive prices. 20 
In a concentrated ownership system, controlling shareholders exercise control over the 
firm greatly in excess of their cash~flow rights, either by the adoption of a pyramidal control 
system or by direct management of the cOiporation. 1l1ese finns are not managed by professional 
and independent managers, but by controlling shareholders. The overlapping of managers 
and controlling shareholders leads to a problem concerning ownership and control, since 
management then tends to run the company in a fashion that maximizes the private benefits 
of controL 21 
Such a problem is comparable to the agency costs verified in corporations with widely 
dispersed ownership, in the sense that in both situations the main goal of management is not to 
'
5 !d. Although share dispersion in Brazilian corporations has increased slightly over time, the 
overall changes are not significant. In 1985, a study analyzing 476 Brazilian corporations showed 
that controllers owned on average 69,8% of the voting stock. In 18.4% of the corporations control-
lers hold between 90 and 1 00% of the stock of publicly heid corporations. See Nelson Eizirik, 0 
Milo do 'Controle Gerenciaf'- Alguns Dados Empfricos, 66 REviSTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 103, 104 
(1987). 
16 Siqueira, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined .. 
17 Nelson S. Filho, Governan9a Corporativa: Padr6es !ntemacionais e Evidf:ncias Empiricas no 
Brasil nos Anos 90, 9 REvlSTA DO BNDES, available at http://www.bndes,gov.br/conhecimento/ 
revista/rev906.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). 
18 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1, 3 {2001 ). 
IS fd. 
2a John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2151, 2157-
8 (2001). 
21 La Poria et al., supra note 11, at 511. 
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maximize the profits of the remaining shareholders, but ro obtain benefits for thernselves to the 
detliment of the shareholders. ~Ihe existence of a market for corporate controt however, helps 
to reduce agency costs, because poorly run companies have lower stock prices and more easily 
become takeover targets. Conversely, in concentrated ownership systems such a market does 
not exist, so that private benefits of control obtained by controlling shareholders are subject to 
fCw constraints. Accordingly, concentrated mvnership finns tend to be managed in a different 
fashion than widely dispersed ones. TI1c fanner often act to maximize the private benefits of 
control for their controlling shareholders, whereas the latter seek to increase the market price 
of their stock. 22 
B) Causes and consequences of different mvnership models 
The exact reasons behind the wide gap between ownership structures in concentrated 
and dispersed systems are still debatable. Scholars have struggled to find explanations for the 
persistence of ownership concentration in countries throughout the world. The justifications 
range from the fragility of the protection granted to minority shareholders to the social nonns 
surrounding the financial markets. 
According to most scholars, the combination of weak minority protection 23 and high 
private benefits of control 24 provides the best formula to explain the existence of concentrated 
ownership. Indeed, both factors are significantly con·clated, since private benefits of control 
describe precisely the situation in which controller shareholders can obtain benefits for 
themselves to the detriment of the minority. 
Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe argue that high private benefits of control deter the 
transition to a dispersed ownership model: since majority shareholders will not be compensated 
by existing shareholders fOr relinquishing the great benefits arising from control, they will be 
reluctant to give up their control \vhen raising extra capitaL 25 
La Porta eta!., recognizing the role played by minority shareholder protection, argue 
that these legal rules tnay be endogenous. Countries with economically and politically powerful 
controlling shareholders may fed compelled to enact laws that entrench such shareholders 
and reduce minority rights. 26 Another way to address this issue, they argue, is to classify legal 
22 John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The fmpacl of Cross~Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 CoLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1764 (2002). 
23 La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 505. La Porta et al. point out that empirical studies demonstrate 
that countries with strong minority protection present the highest level of share ownership disper-
sion. /d. 
24 John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations 
Be? (Harvard Law School Discussion Paper no 450) 12 at www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ 
olin_center/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
25 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownersf1ip and 
Governance, 52 STAN. l. REV. 127, 137 (1999). 
20 Arnoldo Wald observes that the drafters of the 1976 statute consciously increased the allowed 
proportion of ag6es preferenciais and ag6es ordinftrias in order to facilitate financing of Brazilian 
corporations while making it possible for Brazilian entrepreneurs to keep control of the companies. 
See Arnalda Wald, A Obrigar:;ao de Fazer Oferta PUblica e a Transferencia de Controle no Direito 
8rasifeiro, 302 REVISTA FORENSE 49, 49 (1988). 
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systems by the origin of their commercial law rather than by their actual. legal rules. Under this 
view cornmon law afford5 Cetter protection to minority shareholders (and consequently generates 
greater mvnership dispersion) than does civil law. 27 This could be a reasonable explanation for 
the differences between Brazilian and US. corporate systetns. 
In response to La Porta et al. 's conclusions about the superior performance of the 
common law with respect to the civil law in furthering liquid markets and dispersed ownership, 
John Coffee argues that ''conclation does not prove causation11 and that "[njonns do mattei; 
but exactly when and to what extent remain more problematic issues". 28 These assumptions 
arc justified by the fact that the differences in countries' corporate laws do not explain 
satisfactorily the variations in the private benefits of control across countries and the influence 
of social forces independent of any legal sanction to constrain managers and controlling 
shareholders. 29 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the effect of minority protection on the 
emergence of dispersed ownership might have been overstated. Indeed) as Coffee points out, 
nlega[ developments have tended to follow) rather than precede, economic change.10 30 Other 
scholars have cited political reasons to explain ownership concentration. TI1ey claim that social 
democracies styrnie dispersed ownership. The reason given for such a statement is that the 
government's influence on managers~ in the sense of emphasizing disu·ibutiona! considerations 
and favoring employees over capital owners-significantly increases agency costs in the public 
firm, thus thwarting the transition to the dispersed ownership model.31 Alternatively, much 
evidence also indicates that ownership concentration works as an instrument for powerful 
families and governments to reinforce each other and control economies in the Third Wodd.32 
In sum, the differences in ownership structures arc not the result of one single factm; 
but of~~ multitude of causes. It is likely that all the previously identifled factors play a part in 
shaping the counny's corporate organization. TI1e identification of the factors involved, however, 
is of the utmost importance, especially when policymakers have expressly adopted the goal to 
further ownership dispersion, as in BraziL 33 
C) Ownership concentration in Brazil 
Although we should not disregard some cbmKteristic features ofBrazilian economic 
history, we can to a large extent attribute ownership concentration in Brazil to the factors 
discussed in the previous section. 
27 La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 505. 
28 Coffee, supra note 20, at 2175-6. 
29 lei 
3° Coffee, supra note 8, at 7. 
31 See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 
STAN. L. REv. 539, 543 (2000). 
32 Coffee, supra note 18, at 79. 
33 John W. Anderson, Jr., Corporate Governance in Brazil: Recent Improvements and New Chal-
lenges, 9 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 201, 204 (2003), 
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First, it is worth noting that the expression "ownership conccntration11 is used in the 
sense of describing the presence of a controlling shareholder. Indeed, the extensive adoption of 
dual~class shares by Brazilian corporations has led to a peculiar situation, in which stable 
majority controL is combined with widely dispersed nonvoting stock. 34 
Article 15 of the Lei 6.404/76 (the Brazilian corporations statute) provides that 
corporations can have two species of stock: a<;-6es ordinirias (also known ~1-'> ON), which grant 
voting rights, and a~6cs preferenciais (usuaUy called PN), which, though usually nonvoting, 
confer in retum financial advantages to their holders. Until200 1, PN stock could be issued at 
a ratio up to two~ thirds of the company's total stock. The recent alterations to Lei 6.404176 
brought into effect by Lei 10.303 reduced the allmvance ofPN stock issuance to 50% of the 
company's total stock, with the purpose of reducing the conLTollcr's entrenchment with the 
ownership of a low percentage of the firm's stock, JYtade available by the dual~stock 
mechanism.35 The provision, however, only applies to companies incorporated after the 
enacnnentof the statute, so that it<; effects will be noticeable only in the longrun. 
Brazilian economic histoty can also explain how the concentrated ownership structure 
emcrgcd.11te mvnership concentration is due to a large extent to goventmental action in the 
twentieth century. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Brazilian government took charge of funding 
corporations, especially through public financial institutions. Subsequently, Brazil's corporate-
sector development became linked to the industrial.ization process, which took place in 
connection with high tatiffprotections against imports and cheap financing for the COJ1JOrations. 
Following the 1970s, Brazit faced il massive debt crisis. This scenario, also characterized by a 
de~leveraging of the corporate sector, reinforced the ownership concentration in Brazilian 
companies, caused in part by the lack of competition in such an unfriendly economic setting. 36 
The privatization process carried out in the 1990s generated certain changes in the 
usual capital concentration structure of Brazilian corporations, since local business groups had 
to build partnerships with f'Oreign corporations and financial institutions in order to participate 
in the relevant bidding procedures; this process initiated a more representative shared~control 
experience in Brazilian corporations. On the other hand, fOreign ftrms acquired conxrol of a 
considerable number of privatized companies so that the shared control initiatives arising from 
this process did not undennine the ownership structure of Brazilian coqxxations. 37 
Furthermore, the weakness of the protection afforded to minority shareholders in 
the Brazilian legal system is well~known.lnadequate minority protection is one of the main 
causes for the recent dccrca.sc in trading volume on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), 
34 Ricardo Ferreira de Macedo, Limites de Efetividade do Direito Societario na Repress§o ao Uso 
Disfuncional do Poder de Controle nas Sociedades An6nimas, 118 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 167, 
177 (2000). 
'
5 However, while security exchanges advocate that all shares should have voting rights, Brazilian 
corporations insist- on the necessity of PN in a country where dynamic entrepreneurs are scarce and 
where competent elites need to find an instrument in between common stock and debentures. In 
this respect see Watd, supra note 5, at 4. 
36 Anderson, supra note 33, at 206. 
37 /d. at 207. 
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from $1 billion in 1997 to $150 million in 200]. 38 TI1e 30 to I ratio-represented by foreign direct 
investments of$30 billion per year (in the fonnof partnerships or joint ventures) and primary 
equity issuances of roughly $1 billion per year during the 1990s~provides further evidence. 
These figures indicate that the fragility of corporate govemance in Brazil might lead foreign 
investors to invest in the country directly, but not as minmity shareholders. 39 
In addition, private benefits of control in Brazil reach extremely high levels. One 
method used to quantify these benefits compares the difference of the share price in the sale 
of a controlling block with its price after the announcement of the block trade. The eleven 
Brazilian transaction,<; revealed an average premium of around 65%, while in the United States 
and Canada this figure is only 2%. 40 
In effect, vote value in Brazil is between a quarter and a third of the total value of the 
country. The average controller~shareholder in Brazil can have as little as a sixth of the total 
cash-flow 1ights and still be able to extract up to37.5% of the corporation1s total value. Therefore, 
an increment of21% over the ownership of 16.5% cash flow rights is expropriated out of the 
company value. Conversely, common~law counnies show private benefits lower than 10%. 41 
PART II -OWNERSHIP STRUCfURES AND TAKEOVER REGULATION 
Given that takeover rules differ significarttly in Brazil and in the United States, this 
study aims to identify the reasons for such divergent legal treatment. In Brazil, the whole 
discussion focuses on the requirement of a mandatmy bid to the minority shareholders to sell 
their shares in each transaction involving the sale of controL This rule is regarded as a 
fundamental mechanism for the protection of minority shareholders. In the United States, 
however, the primary concern for takeover regulation involves the leeway conferred to the 
board of directors to ward off hostile takeover attempts. 
A) Mandatory public bids in Brazil 
There are no statutory provisions or case law in Brazil regulating takeover defenses in 
hostite takeover attempts. The core of Brazil's legal regulation of transfers of control concerns 
the regime of the so-called 11mandatmy public offering." In its original form, the mandatmy 
public offering rule, also referred as the 11mandatmy bid" rule or 11tag~along" rights, imposes on 
the acquirer of a target company the obligation to offer minmity shareholders the opportunity 
to sell their shares at the same price offered to the conLToHers. 
Although the mandatory public offering is a traditional feature of Brazilian corporate 
law, its regime has not been stable over time. Indeed, it has suffered significant changes due to 
political pressures arising out of the domestic economic situation. 
38 Coffee, supra note 22, at 1776. 
39 /d. at 1775. 
40 Erik Sergi Of & Mike Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, 18 EcoN. PoL'v. 171, 192 (2003). 
41 Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis 
(Harvard University, Sept. 21, 2000) 38, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid= 
221634&cftoken=7463198&abstract_id=237809 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
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First innoduced to the legal system by Lei 6.404/76 (the coqJOrations statute, enacted 
in 1976), the mandatmy public offering provision confened on minority shareholders the right 
to sell their shares at the same price offered to controlling shareholders in a transaction for the 
transfer of control. In the 1990s, however, due to the govcmment's wave of privatizations, 
important provisions of coqx)rate law were modified, including the mandato1y bid requirement. 
Since the state was the controller~shareholder of public corporations, the mandatmy~bicl rule 
was eliminated in order to enable the goverruncnt to keep the all the premium obtained by the 
sale of the companies to private acquircrs. 
By doing away with the public offering requirement, the so~callcd "Lei Kandir11 in 
1997 (Lei 9 .457) allowed the occurrence of a series of oppressive rneasures against the minority 
sharehoLders. In most situations, after purchasing control of the company, the new controllers 
would buy a significant amount of the outstanding shares in the nwrket, thus gradually 
reducing the liquidity of the remaining stock. After th<tt, controllers would promote the de~ 
listing of the company and squeeze out the minority paying thcrn below the market price of 
their shares. +z In a famous case from 1998, a tender offer by J.C Penney to acquire a Brazilian 
retailer created political furor when it offered no premium at all to shareholders that did not 
take part in the controlling block. 43 
In response to the claims of corporate scholars and security' market specialists, in 2001 
the legislature passed Lei 10.303, which modified some articles of lei 6.404/76, with the explicit 
purpose of improving minority shareholders' protection in publicly held corporations. The 
changes included the reintroduction in Brazilian law of a modified version of the mandatory 
public offe1ing requirement. Nevertheless, recognizing that controllers should be entitled to a 
larger slice of the control premium, the new statute requires the bidder to give minority 
shareholders the opportunity to sell their shares at no less than 80% of the price paid to the 
conn·oller shareholders. 
Hence, the new Article 254~A does not reintroduce the principle of equal treatment 
between controllers and minority shareholders in the transfer of control. On the contrary, it 
expressly aHows differentiated treatment to actions of the same class, since the a~6es ordin{trias 
that make up the control block arc worth more than those held by minority shareholders. 44 
Due to ownership concentration, in Brazilian corporate practice, control transfers usually 
occur in a direct manner through the transfer of the control block. 45 
42 MODESTO CARVAI.HOSA, COMENTARIOS A LEI DE SOCIEDADES AN6NIMAS 148 (2003). 
43 The case is cited by Coffee, supra note 22, at 1808. This case gave rise to a lawsuit whose main 
issue involved full and fair disclosure requirements. The court held that PN stockholders could not 
contest the absence of disclosure of the price paid to the controllers, since the protection awarded 
to minority shareholders in this regard extended only to those that owned ON stock. Tribunal de 
Justir,;:a do Rio Grande do Sui. Ape!ayao Civel no 70006446447, Sexta Camara Civel, Relator 
Desembargador Carlos Alberto Alvaro de Oliveira. julgado em 15/10/2003. 
44 CARVALHOSA, supra note 42, 81 149. 
45 ld. at 165. 
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Article 254~A applies whenever cash or assets are given in consideration for the 
transfer of control. In the opinion of the Comissao de Val ores Mobili3.rios (CVM), 46 the 
absence of a premium over the market value of the shares does not eliminate the requirement 
of a mandatory bid. The policy underlying this interpretation is that control has intrinsic 
economic value, even if the sale occurs at a price equal to or bdow the market price of the 
shares. Titere is a presumption that it is in the minority shareholders1 best interest to sell their 
shares at the moment of the control transfer, because of the risk of decrease in the shares' 
liquidity following the company's acquisition. 47 
The new statute resolved the uncertainty regarding the scope of the mandatory bid 
by establishing that only the holders of a~6es ordin3.rias have the right to the bid. Before that, 
there was a significant controversy over the issue. 48 'TI1ere were arguments for the opinion that 
the mandatmy bid should also be extended to shareholders that own PN stock, i.e., that entitle 
the stock's owner to greater participation on the dividends but that grant no voting rights. 
Greater authority, however, already recognized that only stockholders of ON were entitled to 
the privilege of the bid. 49 
B) U.S. takeover law 
TI1e central question in the American cases, explored most fully in Delaware, is the 
extent to which a court will confer discretionary power on the corporation's directors 1 within 
the limits of the business judgment rule, to defend against an actual or prospective hostile 
offer. 5° 
Many of the legal discussions derive from two different views on corporations. 1l1C 
"property" conception of the corporation argues that the corporation exists to maximize the 
wealth of its shareholders. For the property school the markets are generally efficient, and 
better results are obtained if buyers and sellers are free to transfer corporate controL The 
11
entity" scholars, by contrast, consider the corporation as an institution whose puqJose is broader 
than merely increasing stockholder profits. They argue that the interests of all constituencies 
46 CVM is the Brazilian agency in charge of ihe regulation of the securities market, performing the 
equivalent function of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
47 CARVALHOSA, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 184. 
48 Scholars justify the exclusion of PN stockholders from the scope of the mandatory bid by arguing 
that only equal shares should receive equal treatment by the time of the control transfer. Since PN 
stockholders do not play a political role in the company, they should not be entitled to share the 
control premium. See Waid, supra note 26, at 49. 
4~ See, for instance, this important decision of Superior Tribunal de Justiya, the court in charge of 
harmonizing the interpretation of Brazilian federal legislation, holding that "only minority share-
holders that hold aq6es ordin<lrias are protected by the corporate statute." Superior Tribunal de 
Justiya. Recurso Especial no 2276/RJ, Primeira Turma, Relator Ministro Geraldo Sobral, julgado em 
04/02/1991. 
50 Deborah de Matt, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: 
THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 398, 406 (John C. Coffee, Jr et al. ed., 1988). 
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should be taken into account, and that the board of directors should play this role and be 
allowed to ''just say nd' to hostile bids. 51 
In Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that the decision of the board to prompt a tender offer by a corporation for its own shares in 
response to a hostile tender offer should be rncasured by the standard of the business~ judgment 
rule, since the board acted in good faith and after reasonable investigation, and the measure 
was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 52 
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, the Delaware Supreme Court 
decided that once the sale of control becomes inevitable, the board's responsibilities under the 
Unocal standards changed. As the board can no longer protect corporate policy and 
effectiveness, the whole objective of defensive measures becomes moot. Therefore, the Court 
held that the duty of the board should switch from the preservation of the company as an 
entity to auctioning the best price for the stockholders. 53 
In contrast, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. rDme Incorporated, the Delaware 
Supreme Court refused to extend Revlon's application to situations that could be construed as 
putting the corporation up "for sale." The Court then decided that the contested -nme~\Vamer 
merger agreement did not trigger Rcvlon duties, and that the business judgment rule protected 
the board's decision to preserve Time's "culture" by choosing to merge with \Varner. 54 
ln ParamountComn1unications Inc. v. QVCNetwork Inc., the same court tried to 
distinguish Revlon and Time~Warner. According to the Court's opinion, in the latter case 
neither corporation could be said to be acquiring the other, so that control of both remained in 
a large, fluid, and changing market. 55 The Court then held that, when a majority of a 
COITlOration's voting stock is acquired by a single person or by a cohesive group, there is a sale of 
control, so that the main duty of the target's board of directors is to obtain the best value 
reasonably available to its stockholders. 56 
Most scholarly work on the topic focuses on explaining and harmonizing a series of 
apparently inconsistent Delaware Supreme Court decisions. "Can the board just say no?", 
"\XlhB.t triggers Revlon?") and 11What constitutes a change of control? 11 are among the main 
issues in the takeover debate. 
The attempt to find consistency in Delaware takeover jurisprudence has led to 
different sorts of rationalizations. Efforts range fi·om the construction of a f'control~based" 
model of takeover law, which claims that the separate spheres of board~ of director and 
sharehoLder control ofler a framework to understand Delaware Supreme Court decisions) 57 to 
51 William T. Allen et aL, The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual 
Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1067, 1075-6 (2002). 
52 Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (1985). 
50 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (1986). 
54 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-1 (1990). 
55 Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (1994). 
56 /d., at 51. 
57 Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CoRP. 
L. 103, 106 (2003). 
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a I! corporate policy!! model, which argues that management can choose whatever informed 
corporate policy it believes in good f.tith to be in the interest of the company and of its 
shareholders, except when the policy niggers Rev/on duties.55 Nonetheless, there is also authority 
for the view that Delaware cases involving takeover defenses are essentially inconsistent. 59 
C) TI1e effect of ownership structure on takeovers 
As discussed above, the main concerns ofBraziHan and U.S. takeover regimes differ 
significantly. In this section, I consider how the pattelTtofownership concentration or dispersion 
affects the likelihood of hostile takeover attempts and, consequently, the focus of the given 
legal system1s takeover regulation. 
Due to the evident separation of ownership and control in most U.S. companies, 
corporate governance perfonnance in the United States bas to deal with agency costs arising 
fi·om such a scheme. Henry Manne in 1965 introduced the expression "market for corporate 
control, 11 arguing that the decrease in management quality would lead to the fall of the market 
price of a company1s shares, thus creating the appropriate environment for a takeover attempt. 
60 18.keovers1 then, would be an efficient mechanism fOr rccoveringillrmanaged corporations 
61 and would serve to mitigate the structural agency costs. 62 
Takeovers have long been regarded as a means of replacing incompetent managers 
with more efficient ones. Companies with poor recent perforrnance ·,1nd low stock prices are 
more likely to become takeover targets. TI1erefore) the abstract threat of a takeover attempt 
and the fear oflosing their positions constitute important incentives for managers to improve 
the company's value in order to raise share ptices. 
In john Coffee's words, 10 In market~centered economies, the market for corporate 
control is the ultimate disciplinary mechanism, and the hostile takeover, its final guillotine. In 
contrast, in concentrated ownership systems of corporate governance, the takeover has 
historically played only a minor role. But, once again, that pattern is changing rapidly.'' 63 
As mentioned, hostile takeovers are not a universal phenomenon. On the contrary, 
their very existence is due to a corporate system in which shares are widely held. 64 In fact, 
58 Richard E. Kihlstrom, & Michael L. Wachter. Corporate Policy and the Coherence of Delaware 
Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 523, 572 (2003). 
59 HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 7, at 1228. 
60 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. oF POL. EcoN. 110. 
61 William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware Court's 
Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 861 (2003). 
62 Arnaud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Petiormance: The Role of Objec· 
tivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CoRNELL L. REv. 356, 381-2 (2004), 
63 Coffee, supra note 18, at 20, 
64 Notice. however, that the one of the most celebrated benefits of takeovers~the corrective effect 
on the agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership and control-does not exist in 
concentrated ownership systems. Despite the detrimental impact of private benefits of control to the 
minority, it is possible to posit that the incentives are better aligned between managers and 
shareholders to increase corporate performance. as management ultimately is in the hands of 
identified controllers. 
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takeovers and concentrated mvncrships are substitute mechanisms of corporate control because 
lower ownership concentration makes stock markets more liquid and thus facilitates takeovers.65 
Where high levels of mvnership concentration exist, hostile attempts are also impractical and 
transfers of control usually take place only through voluntary transactions. In Brazil, as in 
Continental Europe until recently, takeovers are very rare. 66 
18.keovers face both technical and structural barriers. Technical barriers typically 
refer to those impediments to takeovers that result from rules allocating power between various 
participants in the corporation, i.e., taking away from shareholders the decision whether or not 
to sell their shares, and permitting the board to establish defenses. Structural banicrs, on the 
other hand, arise from econom.ic phenomena such as ownership concentration. 67 
Technical barriers are represented by the so~called "shark repellant'>" found in the 
United States, and they operate to frustrate takeover attempts when they would be otherwise 
attTactive. Structural baniers, conversely, make it unlikely thar hostile takeover bids will emerge, 
because the ownership concentration makes it unfeasible to gain control over a company 
without entering into a voluntary transaction with cunent controllers. 
As Allan Ferrel indicates,, [T]akeover rules governing the use of defensive tactics 
by target management, along with many other so-called \echnical barriers,' are critically 
important when there is a wide dispersion of ownership and control rights. If a company has a 
controller, whether that control is due to a large ownership stake or disproportionate voting 
rights, then these rules rapidly fade in importance. An acquisition will only occur when-and 
only when-the conLToller has somewhat lostcontroL 1168 Deborah Mott points out, furthem1ore, 
that the feasibility of hostile bids in any country depends in large part on the pattern of share 
ownership of that country, on shareholders' ability to transfer their shares freely, and on the 
voting rights allocated to publicly-held shares:1 69 
The evident conclusion is that a hostile bid will not be made t-Or a company unless 
there are enough shares available for sale (typically the public shares) to provide sufficient 
voting rights to give a new owner control over the company. 
One possibility available in all systems of cmvorate law is having separate classes of 
stock that hold different voting rights. 'IO Dual-class (re)capitalization works as an efficient 
banier to hostile~takeover attempts by consolidating the control of the company in the hands 
of insiders. 71 Dual-class structure, adopted by Brazilian corporations in order to combine 
65 La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 509. 
66 De Matt, supra note 50, at 401. 
67 Allen Ferrell, Why Continental European Takeover Law Matters (Harvard Law School Discussion 
Paper no 454) 1 n.2 at www.iaw.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) 
68 /d. at 1. 
69 De Matt, supra note 50, at 400. 
TO /d. 8! 402. 
71 Greg A. Jarrel & Annette B. Poulsen, Dual Class Recapitalizations as Ant/takeover Mechanisms: 
The Recent Evidence, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 129, 149 (1988). 
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financing of the corporation in the public market and entrenchment of majority shareholders, 
ends up being one of the most effective takeover defenses. n 
In Brazil, cts used to be the case in Continental Europe (and still is, though to a lesser 
extent) 73 , acquisitions occur through negotiation between the acquirer and the target 
company's management, and transactions take place outside the public exchanges. As a 
result, takeovers tend to be friendly and the main issue concerns the protection of minority 
shareholders in this transaction. IndeecL the protection of minority shareholders has been a 
major concern in Brazil, since the underdevelopment of the country's financial market is 
attributed to the biased regulation to the benefit of controllers. 74 
The United States, on the other hand, is renowned for its vast minority protection 
and for its thliving financial markets, at least when compared to other countries in the world; 
minority protection is thus not so much of an issue in this regard. Ownership structure by itself 
renders hostile takeovers rather attractive. Therefore, the conflict between the rights of 
shareholders to sell their shares and the power of the board of directors to establish goals for the 
company becomes the central concem. 
111e existence of extensive regulation on hostile takeovers can be explained through 
wide share dispersion considerations. Yet the exact nature of U.S. takeover law requires further 
explanation. 75 Management control in the United States shapes the character of takeover law, 
since m·anagers are the ones who choose whether and where to reincorporate. Therefore, 
Delaware takeover law tends to be as manager-friendly as possible without, however, making 
takeovers so unlikely that the company's value decreases. 76 
PART !II -CONTROL PREMIUM: DIFFERENT RESPONSES TO THE SAME 
ISSUE 
In Part II we observed that the fOcus of Brazilian and U.S. legal systems vvith regard 
to takeover regulation differs significantly and that this gap is due to the difference in the 
countries' ownership structures. For instance, the noted absence oflegal rules on takeover 
n The dual-class structure is such an efficient takeover defense that the 2001 draft of the European 
Directive on takeovers, in order to enhance control contestability, intended to adopt the so-called 
"break-through" rule to void this mechanism once a hostile attempt was announced. This rule was 
later dropped from the draft, but the concept remains. See Bergltif & Burkart, supra note 40, at 174 
73 The old pattern in Europe is being replaced. From 1985 to 1999, the percentage of takeovers 
involving at least one European party rose from 15% to 43%. Coffee, supra note 18, at 20. 
74 See Part I(C). 
75 Like the United States, England has a widely dispersed ownership structure. While hostile 
takeovers are extensively regulated, Eng!ish law in this aspect differs significantly from U.S. law. 
Under the self-regulatory City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, board defenses are discouraged, 
and an obligation is imposed on the control buyer to buy out the remaining minority shareholders 
at the same price it paid to the control seller. Coffee, supra note 18, at 1 n.23. 
16 Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence 
on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1795, 1863 (2002). This 
study shows that companies usually migrate to jurisdictions with anti-takeover statutes, but not to 
the ones with severe anti-takeover statutes, as Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. /d. at 
1873. 
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defenses in Brazil stems from the lack of hostile tender offers. 
1l1is part of the analysis refers to an issue common to both systems: entitlement to 
control premiums. Unlike hostile takeover, whose possible existence depends on the country's 
ownership structure, sale of control transactions and the consequent controversy about 
entitlement of control premiums exist both in the United States and in Brazil. Here, too, the 
approach varies, but since the factual situation may be roughly the same in both systems, some 
arguments can transfer more easily from one system to another. Yet also in this regard, the 
different rules adopted by both countries and their desirability can be justified by each country's 
ownership structure and closely related problems. 
A) Control~premiumsharingrequirements in the United States and in Brazil 
Scholars have given various explanations for the empirical observance of control 
premiums in the sale of control transactions. Control premiums are defined as the empirical 
difference that exists between the price a buyer is willing to pay for shares that convey the 
control of the corporation and for shares that do not grant control. A number of general 
economic and legal factors cause control premiums to emerge. Sources of control premiums 
include synergy value, expropriation value, and pure control value. Synergy value arises 
whenever two assets tun1 out to be more valuable when combined than they are in isolation; 
expropriation value refers to the ability to expropriate wealth through minority shareholders; 
and pure control value is the residua! value arising fi·om management. 77 
Smne scholars argue that takeover premiums prove that takeovers are Hvalue~creating.' 1 
Control premiums have also been explained by a downward~sloping demand curve, which 
justify the premium as a mechanism to induce more optimistic shareholders to sell their stock. 73 
Other schobrs claim conversely that the gains obtained by target shareholders result simply 
from bidder overpayment. 79 
In the United States, the rules regarding control premiums have fluctuated over 
time. In the famous case of Perlman v. Feldman) 80 the court imposed on the controlling 
shareholders the obligation of sharing with the minority the premium obtained by selling the 
controlling block of shares. According to Robert Hamilton, Perlman v. Feldmann reflects a 
LTend in the 1960s in the direction of requiring controllers to share control premiums with the 
minority. TI1c rule, however, was adopted only to be rejected in later cases. "The long~settlcd 
law, 11 which allows controllers to keep the premium, has after been afnm1ed in an impressive 
number of cases. T11us, a general rule has prevailed that controlling shareholders may obtain a 
premium for their shares, and they need not slure such premiun"l with other shareholders. 31 
n John C. Coates IV, ''Fair value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in 
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1274 (2004). 
78 Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate 
Law, 99 YALE l. J. 1235, 1264-6 (1990). 
79 See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597, 629 (1989). 
80 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (1955). 
81 Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE W. 
RES. l. REV. 248, 249 (1985). 
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For instance, in Zetlin v.l·1anson Holdings, Inc. a minorlty shareholder argued that 
all shareholders should be entitled to an opportunity to share equally in a premium paid for 
control of a corporation. 1he New York Court of Appeals held th.at except in cases of looting, 
conversion of a corporate opportunity, fiaud, or bad 6ith, a controller shareholder is entitled to 
keep the premium obtained by the sale of the controlling block. 82 
The court further argued that awarding the minority shareholders an opportunity to 
share equally in any premium paid for a controlling interest would require a radical change in 
the manner in which controlling stock interest is transferred, and that such a change would 
best be done by the legislature. Indeed, the court pointed out that the share requirement 
would call for sale~orcontrol transactions to take place only through an offer to all shareholders, 
i.e., through a tender offer. 63 What the court did, therefore, was to reject imposing a mandatory 
public offering requirement in order to fulfill a transaction involving the sale of controlling 
interest. 
Today, the controller shareholder is not generally required to share with the minolity 
shareholders the control premium received by selling his control block. The standard rationale 
for this view is that minority shareholders will assess these aspects when assessing the price to 
pay for a minority interest in the coq)oration's stock. 84 
Under U.S. law, sharing of control~premium concerns also matter in a different 
scenario: a hostile takeover that may shift control from public shareholders to a controller. In 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVCJ the Delaware Supreme Court characterized the 
control premium as the price paid not only in exchange for the value of a control block of 
shares, but also as compensation to the minority shareholders for their resulting loss of voting 
power.Tite Court considered that there was a loss of voting power, since before the acquisition 
the public shareholders (in the aggregate) owned a majority of Paramount's voting stock. 
Control of the corporation was not vested in a single person or group, but in the fluid aggregation 
of unaffiliated stockholders. \Vhere a majority stockholder exists, however, minority stockholder 
votes become mere fonnalities. 85 
The court further observed that once control has shifted, current shareholders will 
have no opportunity in the future to sell their shares at a control premium. Hence, the loss of 
another opportunity for minority shareholders to obtain a control premium triggered the 
82 Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (1979). 
83 !d. at 389. 
84 Carney & Heimendinger, supra note 61, at 870. Nevertheless, as the authors point out, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has embraced the idea of awarding control premiums to minority share-
holders under the appraisal statute. The use of control premiums to determine the value of shares 
in appraisal circumstances was first fully developed in Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris. Yet the 
author also highlights that control premiums only exist before a transaction on the transfer of 
control. Delaware's current approach toward control premiums, however, has been significantly 
criticized, as it also confers control premiums to minority shareholders when the actual probability 
of a takeover attempt is quite remote, and, on the other hand, may not allow sharing of control 
premiums when control transfers actually take place. 
85 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. OVC, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (1994). 
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obligation of the board ofdirectors to 11take the maximum advantage of the curr-ent opportunity 
to realize for the stockholders the best value reasonably available. 11136 
Therefore, conceming hostile takeovers, the duty of the board varies according to 
the kind of acquisition.1l1e result is different when the transaction is structured as astocbfor, 
stock deal and the bidder has no controlling shareholder, because the target shareholders can 
have another opportunity to enjoy a future control premium for the combined company. 87 
In Brazil since 2001, minority shareholders have the right to sell their shares when 
control is transferred, through the mandatory tende·~offer requirement, but are no longer 
entided to an equal share of the control premium. Since the passage of Lei 10.303/01, the 
mandatory-bid rule has to give all holders of a~6es ordin<'irias the right to sell their shares at a 
price no less than 80% of the one paid to the controllers. Through this new regime, the major 
concern seetn'i to l;.c not the equal aHocation of the control premium, but the tight to shareholders 
to exit the corporation in f~1ir conditions when control is to be alienated. 
B) Policy arguments in favor of and against the different rules 
There arc two dominant schools of academic thought concerning the rights of 
minotily shareholders to share premiurn.'> when controllers sell their shares (or the mandatory-
bid rule). 88 According to the equal-sharing school, minority shareholders should always have 
the right to share the control premium obtained in a sale of control. On the other hand, the 
deregulatory school believes that control premiums should not have to be shared. The cunent 
doctrine, however, does not align with any of the academic schools, as it allows controlling 
sh::treholders to keep the entire pren1ium fOr themselves in most, but not all, transactions. 89 
William D. Andrews, in his famous article in favor of the shming of contTol premiums, 
argues that "[aj controlling shareholder should not be free to sell, at least to an outsider, except 
pursuant to a purchase offer made equally available to other shareholders; or, put in the 
affinnativc, that one of the rights of the minority shareholders is to have an equal opportunity 
with all other stockholders to participate ratably in any sale of shares pursuant to a favorable 
offer for the purchase of controlling shares in their corporation.'' 90 
86 !d. at 44. 
87 Paredes, supra note 57, at 103. 
as In this part, the arguments for and against sharing the control premium and the mandatory-bid rule 
will be used interchangeably, since the connections between the arguments in this regard out-
weigh the distinctions of the concepts. The concepts, however, are far from being identical. There 
can be a mandatory-bid rule without a full control-premium sharing requirement, which is found in 
Article 254-A of Lei 6.404/76, and a control-premium sharing requirement without a mandatory-bid 
rule, which occurs when the entitlement of the minority to control premiums is recognized ex post, 
as U.S. courts rule in looting cases. However, as the Zetfin court noted, the enforcement of a 
general requirement to share the control premium requires the implementation of a mandatory 
tender offer each time control is to be sold. Zetfin, 397 N.E.2d at 389. 
89 Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1465, 1465 
(1992). 
90 William 0_ Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. 
L. Rev. 505, 506 (1965). 
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Scholars have put forth several justifications for the rule for equal treatment. One of 
the arguments~ the main one in Brazil-claims that a transaction for the sale of control brings 
with it the danger that, after a transfer of controlling shares, corporate affairs may be run in a 
way that is hannful to the rernaining shareholders who did not have an opportunity to sell their 
stock.l11e rule of equal OP1X1l"tunity, however, is not dependent upon harm to the coq}()ration.91 
Other scholars, subsequent to Berle and Means, h.ave viewed control as a corporate asset, thus 
requiring an equal division of the gains from a transfer of control between controllers and 
minority shareholders. 92 
Consideration .. <; of equality and fairness stemming from the "social~political canon of 
equal treatment" also augur in favor of the mandatory~bid rule, whose objective is to implement 
de facto equal treannent of all shareholders in the target company. In Bcrgstrt':lm and Hogtetdes 
words, ''[T]he specific legislative objective [of the mandatory~bicl rule] is to prevent a raider 
from taking out the 'widows and orphans' cheaply and paying the 'real price' only to the 
controlling shareholders.'' 93 
Still, under a law~and~economics perspective, rules requiring the sharing of the 
control premium cannot be justified in most situations. In1posing equal treatment on non-
controlling shareholders may serve to deter not only unproductive control transfers, but also 
productive ones. TI1erefore, applying such a rule tends to lessen the undcr~deterrence of 
harmful control transfers, but leads to over~deterrence of efficient ones. 94 Moreover, economists 
start from the premise that, as any other voluntary transaction, there is a strong presumption 
that the transfer of corporate control promotes a reallocation of resources to where they are 
more highly valued. 95 
Since the mandatory-bid rule decreases the occurrence of both desirable and 
undesirable transactions, we must examine the likelihood that the new controller, rather than 
increasing firrn value, will extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 96 Additionally, given that the mandatory~bid rule reduces the probabitity of a 
takeovct~ there is a drawback when this rule is applied to firms with concentrated ownership, 
since such application might reduce sales of control blocks and thereby ~'lock in" the cun·cm 
controller, even if another controller WOlJld be able to add value. 97 
It is important to note that the interaction between the advantages and drawbacks 
of a control~premium sharing requirement vary according to the corporate governance 
characteristics of the country. Economists contend that the mandatmy~bid rule might trigger 
results contrary to its express goal. In general, the rule turns out to be detrimental to target 
91 /d. at 517~8. 
92 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions. 91 YALE L.J. 698, 716 
(1982). 
93 Clas BergstrOm & Peter H6gfeldt, The Equal Bid Principle: An Analysis of the Thirleenth Council 
Takeover Directive of the European Union, 24 {3) & (4) J. Bus. FIN. AND AcCT. 375, 377 (1997). 
S4 Elhauge, supra note 89, at 1466. 
95 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 92, at 705. 
00 Ferrell, supra note 67, at 6. 
97 /d. at 8. 
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shareholdcrs1 since efficient transactions will be hindered. Therefore, in a mature market such 
as the US. market, the absence of the rule seems justifiable. In the words of Anupam Chandct; 
~'1l1e law generally pcnnits the controlling shareholder to sell her shmes at a 1control premium.1 
In doing so, the law recognizes and validates the extra value of control. But it does so on behalf 
of the minority". 98 
Nevertheless, in counnies where private benefits of control are high~such as Brazil, as 
we have seerHhe mandatory-bid rule might play an important part in protecting shareholders 
in a takeover situation. 99 
CONCLUSION 
We can explain the hierarchy of the main issues of takeover law in the United States 
and in Brazil by looking at each countrls ownership structure. \Xlhen widely dispersed stock 
creates an environment conducive to hostile takeover attempts, courts and legislatures create 
laws to deal with the issue. In Brazil, where the likelihood of a hostile takeover is drastically low, 
regulation of takeover defenses h.as not yet emerged. 
We can attribute the regimes regarding the division of the control premium in the 
United States and in Brazil to the different levels ofboth countries' corporate~ law and financial~ 
market development. Since the weak protection of minority shareholders is considered to 
stymie Brazil's financial market development, sharing of the control prem_ium is justified as an 
instrument to avoid the perpetration of further abuses. 
In the United States, however, where general minority~ shareholder protection is 
adequate and securities markets well developed, the legal system is in better conditions to 
comply with the law~and~econmnics statement that the absence of a sharing requirement 
triggers a more efi1cient allocations of resources. 
Brazilian policymakers should begin to familiarize themselves with the takeover 
issues arising in the United States, since stock dispersion~which facilitates hostile takeovers-is 
one of main goals ofBrazil's recently created Novo Mercado. 100 Brazil1s Novo Mercado consists 
of new listing options conceived by Bovespa (the S8o Paulo Stock Exchange) in order to react 
to the legislature's apathy in passing investor~friendly regulations. 101 Until2001, despite the 
constant demands of investors and cmvoratc scholars, the legislature did not take a position 
about increasing minority protection in Brazilian financial market. Since adherence to the 
Novo Mercado (and consequently to higher standards of transparency and efficiency in 
corporate governance than even those in the amended Lei 6.404) is voluntary, this approach 
has the advantage of being less politically confTontational. 102 
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Furthennore, Novo Mercado goes beyond the statute on a variety of topics, including 
the statutory requirement of a mandatory~bid rule. It requires the granting of"tag along" rights 
to aU non~controlling shareholders so that, in a sale~of~control transaction, they have the right 
to sell their shares at the same price paid to the controller. Additionally, Novo Mercado prohibits 
the issuance of nonvoting shares and imposes compliance with a "one~share, one~vote' 1 rule. 103 
These rules address the deficiencies of Lei 6.404/76 with regard to both the 80% minimum 
requirement to be paid to non~controlling shareholders according to the mandatory~bid rule, 
and to the 50/50 allowance for the issuance of nonvoting stock. Novo Mercado rhus 
demonstrates that Brazil is taking important steps to improve corporate~governance mechanisms 
that lead to better minmityprotection and, consequently, create an atmosphere more favorable 
for the emergence of a dispersed ownership structure. 
All these recent developments provide excellent reasons for why the issues of hostile 
takeovers faced by policyrnakers in the United States should start to interest Brazilian 
policymakers. As Allen Ferrell points out, despite its ownership concentration and the low 
probability of takeovers, 11timing" makes a difference. 104 Best takeover regulation is enacted 
when there is not a significant number of potential targets, since at that moment political 
pressures from apprehensive managers and labor organizations are reduced. Indeed, scholars 
suggest that state competition in the United States~combined with the fact that the decision 
of whether and where to reincorporate rests in the hands of managers~ has led to expressive 
incorporation in states with anti~ takeover statutes, which is detrimental to shareholders' 
interests. 105 
Moreover, U.S. academic works provide interesting insights for a better understanding 
of Brazilian takeover law. Although under Brazil's current corporate~governance setting the 
mandatmy public offering rule seems justiftable (and the limitation to 80% of the price paid to 
controllers seems subject to criticism), the comparative, law perspective suggests that the 
advantages of the rule are neither apparent nor universal. Whereas the rule at present avoids 
major expropriations of minority shareholders, further developments in Brazil's corporate~ 
governance structure may point in the direction of another kind of regulation in order to take 
full advantage of the beneflts of a market for corporate control. 
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